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fore, is not inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the Act,
promotion of industrial peace.
The Libby case establishes a threshold test for determining
whether a particular decision is a unique management prerogative
because of its bearing upon the ability of private enterprise to
manage and be responsible for its own affairs. Only when this
threshold issue of whether the decision is one which affects the
direction of the corporate enterprise, involving the commitment of
invested capital, is resolved in the negative can consideration be
given to the question of whether the decision itself is bargainable
because of its effects upon terms and conditions of employment.
When the threshold issue is answered affirmatively, the interests of
the bargaining unit are considered sufficiently protected under the
Wisconsin Employment Peace Act by requiring bargaining solely
with regard to the decisions's "effects."
ROBERT J. BoiVIN
Constitutional Law: Testimonial Privilege of Newsmen-It has
long been recognized that there is incumbent upon each citizen a
duty to testify when summoned by a court exercising its lawful
jurisdiction. The imposition of such a testimonial duty is thought
to be a natural and elementary obligation which must be met if our
judicial system is to function in the fair and orderly manner de-
manded by both individual litigants and society.' Although the
parties to a very small and select group of relationships have been
granted testimonial privileges protecting confidential communica-
tions, the courts have been very reluctant to elevate the relationship
of a newsman with his confidential sources to a similar status. 2
Unlike doctors, lawyers, and other professionals who enjoy such a
privilege, 3 newsmen are often forced to choose between incurring a
1. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: "[P]ersons summoned as witnesses
by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary
concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machi-
nery." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). See also Blackmur v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931); and Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1918).
2. The case most often cited for the common law rule that no privilege exists in favor
of communications made to newsmen is People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York
County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See also 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 546 (1948);
97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 259 (1957); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966).
3. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 209-223 (1945).
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contempt citation with possible incarceration and violating the
oath of confidentiality 4 taken by them to protect their sources of
information.
In the case of State v. Knops,s the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
appears to have taken a step toward partially saving the newsman
from his plight by granting to him, on the basis of the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of the press, a qualified testimonial
privilege to refrain from disclosing sources of information received
by him in a confidential relationship. While this decision is signifi-
cant insofar as it represents only the second reported case to find
first amendment protection to exist in such a situation,' close exam-
ination reveals that there remain, unanswered, questions having a
direct bearing upon the practical application of the qualified privi-
lege created.
Mark Knops, editor of the Madison Kaleidoscope,7 asserted his
testimonial privilege when he was subpoenaed to appear before a
Walworth County grand jury, which had been convened originally
on July 1, 1970, to investigate the alleged arson of Old Main Hall
on the campus of Wisconsin State University at Whitewater. Less
than two months later, following the bombing of Sterling Hall on
the University of Wisconsin campus, the grand jury began investi-
gating the possibility that a conspiracy to perpetrate the Sterling
Hall crime was committed in Walworth County. Because
Kaleidoscope, two days after the bombing, printed a front page
story entitled, "The Bombers Tell Why and What Next-Exclusive
to Kaleidoscope," Knops was confronted before the grand jury
with specific questions' as to the identity of the person or persons
4. The American Newspaper Guild has adopted the following as part of the newsman's
code of ethics:
Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential
information in court or before other judicial or investigative bodies.
BIRD & MERWIN, THE NEWSPAPER AND SocIETY 567 (1942).
5. 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
6. The first case to find constitutional protection was Application of Caldwell, 311 F.
Supp. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Prior to this, several courts had rejected the argument that the
free press guarantee provided protection for newsmen: Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 H. 317, 367
P.2d 472 (1961); State v. Buchanan, - Ore. _ 436 P.2d 729 (1968), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905 (1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
7. For purposes of this appeal, the court recognized Kaleidoscope to be a newspaper,
and Knops to be a newsman. 49 Wis. 2d at 651, 183 N.W.2d at 95.
8. Knops appeared before the grand jury twice. On the first occasion, he asserted his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, despite the fact that he had been granted
immunity. Having been found in contempt, he petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for
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from whom this information was obtained. Having refused to an-
swer, the editor was found to be in contempt pursuant to section
295.01(5) of the Wisconsin Statutes9 and sentenced to imprison-
ment in the county jail for five months and seven days, or until such
time as he purged himself by answering the questions. 10
Throughout the proceedings, the defendant argued that disclo-
sure of identities would result in an abridgement of first amendment
liberty." The court summarized his position as follows:
Knops contended that if he breached his promise of confidential-
ity, his sources would dry up, and he would no longer have access
to information which the public has a right to know. Conse-
quently, the freedom of the press would be abridged and dimin-
ished.' 2
While accepting this argument in principle, 3 the supreme court
recognized that such a right, like the free press guarantee itself,
cannot be absolute. 14 Consequently, rather than adopt an absolute
testimonial privilege, the court established a case-by-case ap-
a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violation of his constitutional right under the first amend-
ment to refuse to divulge the information sought. The supreme court denied the petition on
the ground that the questions asked were merely preliminary, in no wise inquiring about the
identity of his sources. On his second appearance before the grand jury, Knops purged
himself of the first contempt citation by answering the preliminary questions; however, when
asked specifically drawn questions concerning the identity of his sources of information, he
refused to answer and was, again, held in contempt. 49 Wis. 2d at 649-50, 183 N.W.2d at
94-95.
9. Wis. STAT. § 295.01 (1969):
Every court of record. . . shall have the power to punish by fine and imprisonment,
or either, any neglect or violation of duty. . . in the following cases:
(5) All persons summoned as witnesses . . . for refusing. . . to answer as such
witnesses.
10. With regard to the length of the sentence, it is interesting to note that the right to
trial by jury is guaranteed to all persons cited for contempt who have been sentenced to more
than six months in jail. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
11. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional questions involved in a case such as
this, see Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969).
12. 49 Wis. 2d at 649-50, 183 N.W.2d at 94.
13. Without addressing itself specifically to the proposition, the court apparently as-
sumed that under the first amendment, Knops had a right to gather news. Although this
interpretation of the Constitution has never been directly sustained, certain decisions seem
to indicate that such a holding is not an unreasonable extension of the first amendment. See
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
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proach, which would require a balancing of the various interests
involved before determining whether a privilege should exist under
the particular facts of each case. 15 In the words of the court:
We conclude that a weighing of competing values is involved
here. The court must consider on the one hand the interest of free
flow of information, and on the other, the interest of a fair and
effective administration of the judicial system."8
Thus, the court held that unless the state can affirmatively demon-
strate both a compelling need for the testimony sought and the lack
of an alternative method of gaining such information, a newsman
cannot be required to give testimony regarding the identity of confi-
dential sources. If, on the other hand, such compelling need and
lack of alternative sources are established, the newsman will be
required to testify regardless of any possible effects upon the free
flow of information to the public. 17
Having applied this test to Mr. Knops' situation, the supreme
court found the scale to weigh more heavily in favor of the state's
interest in effective administration of the judicial system and, thus,
held the newly established qualified privilege inapplicable to the
facts of this case. Unlike Application of Caldwell,"8 the first Ameri-
can court decision recognizing a constitutional privilege to refrain
from disclosing news sources, the Knops case did not, in the evalua-
tion of the court, present facts which justified invocation of the
privilege. Whereas in Caldwell the grand jury did not have any
specific crime to investigate or any specific questions to ask the
newsman involved, in Knops the Walworth County grand jury was
concerned with a particular crime and had framed specific ques-
tions. Further, the sources involved in Caldwell were members of
the Black Panther Party-a group "much more sensitive to possi-
ble breaches of confidence than were most groups."'" From such
15. Whenever the United States Supreme Court has been confronted with a claim of
constitutional protection against the exercise of governmental powers, it has employed the
test of balancing the respective public and private interests involved. Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
16. 49 Wis. 2d at 658, 183 N.W.2d at 99.
17. Id. at 657, 183 N.W.2d at 98.
18. In Caldwell, the test established was whether there exists "a compelling and overrid-
ing national interest that cannot be served by an alternative means." 311 F. Supp. at 360.
19. Affidavits presented at Caldwell's trial showed that Black Panther sources all over
the nation had "shut up" at the mere threat of a newsman's being called before a grand
jury. Id. at 360.
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language, one might conclude that the court considered, as a factor
in the baiance, the overall value to the public of the information
conveyed to a newsman by his informer. In essence, did not the
court find a substantial value in having the public learn more about
such an important, yet often secretive, group as the Black Panther
Party? Can it not be fairly said, on the other hand, that the court
found no such value to the public in obtaining such information as
that contained in the Kaleidoscope article? As the court put it:
In this case the public was treated. . . to a long polemic on how
property destruction and murder were simply necessary steps en
route to a higher goal-the restructuring of society.
• ..If the public were faced with a choice between learning
the identity of the bombers or reading their justifications for
anarchy, it seems safe to assume that the public would choose to
learn their identities. 20
In light of this language, the question arises as to whether the
court has, in fact, supplemented, or even supplanted, the
"compelling-need" test with one based upon a judicial determina-
tion as to whether a source of information should be protected
because the reading public would be significantly interested in or
benefited by the dissemination of such information. Contending
that the majority did not, in fact, apply the "compelling-need" test
it had just established 2 Justice Heffernan, in his partial dissent,
pointed out that records of the state and the United States Depart-
ment of Justice indicated that the knowledge sought concerning the
Sterling Hall bombing had already been attained by alternative
means.22 Consequently, had the "compelling-need" test alone been
applied, the court would have had no alternative but to find the
state without a compelling interest in acquiring testimony concern-
ing the identity of the bombers.
20. 49 Wis. 2d at 657-58, 183 N.W.2d at 98.
21. In the words of Justice Heffernan:
The majority's stated generality does not do justice to its own sound position-which
is not one approving the curtailment of information, but compelling, in the case of
overriding state interest, the production of information by proper legal process.
49 Wis. 2d at 660-61, 183 N.W.2d at 100. This position was bolstered by the United States
Supreme Court which, speaking through the late Mr. Justice Black, stated: "No suggestion
can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there granted for speech and the press
bears any inverse relation to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression."
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941).
22. 49 Wis. 2d at 661, 183 N.W.2d at 100.
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Another question raised as a resultof this case is that of deter-
mining what constitutes a "compelling need" for knowledge of the
identity of confidential sources. According to the court, such a need
exists where successful administration of criminal justice is depen-
dent upon disclosure.23 Is the court, in dicta, saying that the mere
bringing of a criminal charge satisfies the state's burden of estab-
lishing a compelling interest? Will the court make a distinction
between crimes of violence and those of a less serious nature? Or
will the mere designation of an action as "criminal" satisfy the
requirement of "compelling need," regardless of whether or not the
crime involved has any seriously disruptive effects upon society?
Further, as the court limited itself strictly to questions involving
the applicability of the privilege in criminal cases, the problem
arises as to its application in civil cases, particularly those which
arise out of an alleged libel. While those few courts which even
suggest the possibility that a privilege may exist are still quite
divided on the question of determining the appropriate standard to
be applied in ruling upon the need for disclosure,24 there is much
authority for the proposition that regardless of what is deemed to
be the appropriate civil standard, it should in no event duplicate
that applied in a criminal prosecution.?
While the general rules announced by the court may, on their
face, appear to offer relief to those in the situation of Knops,
newsmen and their confidential sources are undoubtedly question-
ing their effectiveness in application, particularly in view of the
court's suggestion that Knops, himself, provide the alternative
methods of acquiring the information sought. The court presumed
that because "the culprits are still at large" the state had satisfied
any burden it may have had of showing lack of an alternative
source. 2 Thus, unlike the approach of the federal court in Caldwell,
23. Id. at 659, 183 N.W.2d at 99.
24. One court has established a loose standard, requiring disclosure of sources whenever
their identity would be "relevant in that it would have some bearing and may lead to some
admissible evidence." Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D.
Mass. 1957). Another court has set the standard as requiring disclosure whenever the identity
of sources goes "to the heart" of the claim being litigated. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545,
549-50 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). As stated previously, the court in
Caldwell established the strict standard of compelling disclosure only when the party seeking
the information can demonstrate a compelling and overriding need which cannot be served
by alternative means. 311 F. Supp. at 360.
25. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11; Comment, Confidentiality of News Sources
under the First Amendment, 11 STAN. L. Rav. 541, 545 (1959); 61 MicH. L. REv. 184, 186
(1962).
26. 49 Wis. 2d at 659, 183 N.W.2d at 100 (dissenting opinion).
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it appears that the Wisconsin court has, in effect, shifted the burden
from the state, in proving lack of an alternative source, to the
newsman, in proving the existence of one. Under this approach, a
newsman could avoid both a contempt citation and violation of his
oath of secrecy by leading those seeking disclosure to those posses-
sing the same information, but not having newsman status. Would
not knowledge of this among sources restrict the amount of infor-
mation they would supply and, thus, result in an indirect burden
upon the free flow of news-an interest the privilege purports to
protect?
Apparently in response to the holding in Knops, and following
the example of seventeen other states,21 the Wisconsin legislature is
now considering passage of a newsman's privilege statute.2 This
proposed legislation 9 is sharply qualified, however, by excluding
from its protection "the source of any allegedly defamatory infor-
mation in any case where the defendant, in a civil action for defa-
mation, asserts a defense based on the source of such informa-
tion."' 30 The clear intent of the legislature, as evidenced by this
important qualification, is to deter those who disseminate "libel-
ous" information from using the statute as a "shield" to prevent
their detection. Well-founded as such a consideration might be, the
legislature seems to have taken a blanket approach toward all defa-
27. For a list and analysis of these statutes, see D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe:
Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIs. 307 (1969). See also
ALASKA STATS. § 09.25150 (1967), and NEw YORK L. 1970, Ch. 615 § 79-A, which were
not in force at the publication of the D'Alemberte article. For examples of cases which have
denied a newsman a testimonial privilege in jurisdictions which have a non-disclosure statute,
see Bronzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W. 2d 345 (Ky. 1970), and In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193
A.2d 181 (1963).
28. S. 585: An Act to Create § 885.225 of the Statutes Relative to a Newsman's
Privilege, introduced June 8, 1971.
29. In terms of ivho will enjoy the status of "newsman" and under what circumstances
the privilege will exist, the scope of the proposed statute is quite broad. Section 885.225(1)
of S. 585 provides:
[N]o person shall be required by any court, grand jury, agency, department or com-
mission of this state or of a municipality or by the senate or assembly or any
committee of the legislature or of a municipal legislative body to disclose any confi-
dential information received or obtained by him in his capacity as a reporter, editor,
commentator, journalist, writer, correspondent, photographer, announcer or other
person directly engaged in the gathering or presentation of news for any newspaper,
periodical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service or radio or television
station.
30. Section 885.225(3)(b) of S. 585. Subsection (3)(a) of the proposed statute excludes
"any information which has at any time been published, broadcast or otherwise made public
by the person claiming the privilege."
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mation actions, regardless of whether the identity of the sources is
in any way required by the plaintiff to prove his cause of action. 1
Under the statute, the testimony which would be compelled in
criminal cases and civil actions, other than those specifically ex-
cluded, would be that for which there exists a "compelling and
overriding national interest which cannot be served by an alterna-
tive means." What considerations, if any, went into the selection
of the Caldwell wording, rather than that which the Wisconsin
court used, cannot be determined. What is significant, however, is
that the proposed statute, like the Knops holding itself, makes no
differentiation in terms of how the privilege will be applied to var-
ious degress of criminal conduct, thereby providing no greater
guideline.
CONCLUSION
While the case of State v. Knops will stand as a landmark
decision in terms of its interpretation of the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of the press, there still remain many unanswered
questions concerning application of the privilege. When will a
"compelling need" for knowledge of the source of information be
deemed to exist? Will this be determined according to the court's
estimation of the overall value of the information to the public?
Will the state always have a "compelling interest" in any evidence
relative to the prosecution of criminal activity, regardless of how
minor the particular charges might be? The result of this uncer-
tainty is a situation wherein lower courts, newsmen, and, most
importantly, confidential news sources are left in substantial doubt
as to how the privilege will be applied in their particular cases-a
doubt uncleared by any legislation that has, thus far, been proposed
in this state.
JAMES A. BAXTER
Evidence: The Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law: Evi-
dentiary Limitations-In 1969, the Wisconsin Legislature passed
what is now referred to as the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance
Control Law.I This enactment is patterned after a similar provision
31. See note 24 supra.
1. Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 427; Wis. STAT. §§ 968.28-.34 (1969).
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